Prepared by: Nick Thanos | Published: 31 July 2026
Since mid-2024, a ransomware group called Lynx has been targeting organisations across manufacturing, legal, energy, construction, healthcare, telecommunications and finance by exfiltrating sensitive data and encrypting victim systems. Active globally and observed directly by Triskele Labs across two incident response engagements in Australia, the group is widely believed to be a rebrand or continuation of INC Ransom, operating under the same ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model and pursuing the same double extortion approach against enterprise Windows and Linux environments, including VMware ESXi systems.
Lynx first emerged in mid-2024 and is widely believed to be a rebrand or continuation of INC Ransomware. Under its ransomware-as-a-service model, affiliates carry out intrusions using infrastructure and tooling provided by the core operation, encrypting victim systems while exfiltrating sensitive data to pressure payment through dedicated leak sites hosted on both the clearnet and the dark web.
The group has been especially active across the United States, Europe, the United Kingdom and Australia. As of early 2025, over 90 organisations had been impacted, with several high-profile breaches involving multi-million-dollar ransom demands. Despite a temporary slowdown in public activity in early 2025, Lynx remains active and continues to pose a significant threat. Its ties to the former INC Ransom operation, and its demonstrated ability to adapt and rebrand, suggest it is likely to remain a notable actor in the ransomware landscape.
Across the two incidents investigated by Triskele Labs, a consistent, methodical pattern of compromise emerged.
Lynx affiliates exploit SSL VPNs configured with permissive LDAP settings, the protocol many organisations use to connect their VPN to Active Directory for authentication. Where this is misconfigured, any domain user can authenticate remotely using standard credentials, often bypassing least-privilege controls entirely.
This is consistent with the broader Australian landscape. Exposed SSL VPN services without MFA were the single largest initial access vector across all Triskele Labs ransomware engagements in FY25, accounting for 23 incidents, up 64% from the previous year.
Lynx also gains footholds through Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) platforms, legitimate software used by IT teams and managed service providers to remotely administer systems, where client accounts lacked multi-factor authentication. Without MFA, a stolen or guessed password is sufficient to hand affiliates persistent, administrative-level access.
Once inside, Lynx affiliates actively leverage the same RMM tools used to gain access, monitoring the victim environment, maintaining long-term presence, and exfiltrating sensitive data ahead of encryption. This reliance on tools already trusted within the environment makes early detection harder for defenders relying on signature-based tooling alone.
Once exfiltration is complete, the ransomware binary is activated across the environment. Files are encrypted and appended with a .lynx extension, rendering data inaccessible to users.
The consistent entry points observed across Lynx engagements mean there are clear, actionable controls that reduce risk materially.
Enforce MFA across all external-facing services without exception.
Lynx's most common entry points, exposed VPNs and RMM platforms, both lacked MFA in the incidents Triskele Labs responded to. This single control would have closed off initial access in both cases.
Review VPN and LDAP configurations.
Permissive LDAP settings that allow any domain account to authenticate remotely undermine least-privilege access entirely. Restrict VPN authentication to only the accounts and groups that genuinely need it.
Monitor for anomalous use of legitimate remote access tools.
Because Lynx relies on RMM software already present in many environments, detection needs to focus on unusual usage patterns, not just known-bad signatures.
Maintain immutable, offline backups.
Given the double extortion model, backups protect against the encryption impact but do not prevent data exfiltration, so they are one part of a layered response, not the whole answer.
Ensure security alerting is monitored around the clock.
Whether through an internal security operations capability or an external managed detection and response (MDR) provider, continuous monitoring closes the gap between initial access and full encryption.
Lynx is an active, financially motivated ransomware group operating under a ransomware-as-a-service model since mid-2024, widely believed to be a rebrand of INC Ransom. Triskele Labs has responded directly to two Lynx incidents, giving firsthand insight into the group's behaviour. The pattern is consistent: gain initial access through a misconfigured VPN or an unprotected RMM platform, use that same RMM access to monitor and exfiltrate data, then deploy ransomware across the environment.
The defences most likely to disrupt a Lynx intrusion are foundational: enforce MFA on every external-facing service, tighten VPN and LDAP configuration, and monitor for anomalous use of legitimate remote access tools. Lynx is not a technically exceptional group. It succeeds because the environments it targets have not applied the controls that would stop it at the door.
If your organisation has experienced a Lynx incident or suspects a compromise involving ransomware or data exfiltration, engage your cyber insurer and a reputable DFIR firm promptly.
| TACTIC | TECHNIQUE | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|---|
|
Initial Access |
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
Obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defence Evasion. |
|
Initial Access |
T1078.004 - Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts |
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defence Evasion. |
|
Initial Access |
T1133 - External Remote Services |
Leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. |
|
Initial Access |
T1199 - Trusted Relationship |
Gaining initial access through a trusted third-party relationship. |
|
Execution |
T1072 - Software Deployment Tools |
Gain access to and use centralised software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. |
|
Execution |
T1059.001 - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. |
|
Execution |
T1569.002 - System Services: Service Execution |
Abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. |
|
Persistence |
T1053.005 - Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. |
|
Persistence |
T1136.001 - Create Account: Local Account |
Create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. |
|
Persistence |
T1543.003 - Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
Create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. |
|
Privilege Escalation |
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
Obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defence Evasion. |
|
Defence Evasion |
T1070.001 - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs |
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. |
|
Defence Evasion |
T1070.004 - Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
Delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. |
|
Defence Evasion |
T1562.001 - Impair Defences: Disable or Modify Tools |
Modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware and activities. |
|
Credential Access |
T1003.001 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). |
|
Credential Access |
T1555 - Credentials from Password Stores |
Search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. |
|
Credential Access |
T1558.003 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting |
Abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service ticket vulnerable to brute force. |
|
Discovery |
T1046 - Network Service Discovery |
Attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices. |
|
Discovery |
T1057 - Process Discovery |
Attempt to get information about running processes on a system. |
|
Discovery |
T1087.002 - Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. |
|
Discovery |
T1135 - Network Share Discovery |
Look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather. |
|
Lateral Movement |
T1021.001 - Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Use valid accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol. |
|
Lateral Movement |
T1072 - Software Deployment Tools |
Gain access to and use centralised software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. |
|
Lateral Movement |
T1550.002 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash |
Use stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. |
|
Command and Control |
S0154 - Cobalt Strike |
Simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors. |
|
Command and Control |
T1219 - Remote Access Software |
Use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. |
|
Command and Control |
T1572 - Protocol Tunnelling |
Tunnel network communications within a separate protocol to avoid detection or filtering, or to enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. |
|
Exfiltration |
T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
Steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. |
|
Exfiltration |
T1567.002 - Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. |
|
Impact |
T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact |
Encrypt data on target systems to interrupt availability to system and network resources. |
|
Impact |
T1529 - System Shutdown/Reboot |
Shutdown or reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. |
|
Impact |
T1531 - Account Access Removal |
Interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts used by legitimate users. |
|
Credential Access |
T1003.001 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). |
|
Credential Access |
T1003.003 - OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
Attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database to steal credential information. |
|
Credential Access |
T1003.006 - OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |
Attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's API. |
|
Credential Access |
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
Obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defence Evasion. |
|
Credential Access |
T1110 - Brute Force |
Use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or hashes are obtained. |
|
Credential Access |
T1110.002 - Brute Force: Password Cracking |
Attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. |
|
Credential Access |
T1555 - Credentials from Password Stores |
Search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. |
|
Credential Access |
T1552 - Unsecured Credentials |
Search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. |
|
Discovery |
T1018 - Remote System Discovery |
Attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier that may be used for Lateral Movement. |
|
Discovery |
T1033 - System Owner/User Discovery |
Attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly use a system. |
|
Discovery |
T1046 - Network Service Discovery |
Attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices. |
|
Discovery |
T1069 - Permission Groups Discovery |
Attempt to discover group and permission settings. |
|
Discovery |
T1069.002 - Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups |
Attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. |
|
Discovery |
T1083 - File and Directory Discovery |
Enumerate files and directories or search specific locations of a host or network share for information. |
|
Discovery |
T1087 - Account Discovery |
Attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. |
|
Discovery |
T1087.002 - Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. |
|
Discovery |
T1135 - Network Share Discovery |
Look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather. |
|
Discovery |
T1482 - Domain Trust Discovery |
Attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. |
|
Discovery |
T1615 - Group Policy Discovery |
Gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation and security measures applied within a domain. |
|
Lateral Movement |
T1021.002 - Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Use valid accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). |
|
Lateral Movement |
T1550.002 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash |
Use stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. |
|
Lateral Movement |
T1570 - Lateral Tool Transfer |
Transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. |
|
Collection |
T1005 - Data from Local System |
Search local system sources to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration. |
|
Collection |
T1039 - Data from Network Shared Drive |
Data was collected from shared network drives. |
|
Collection |
T1119 - Automated Collection |
Use automated techniques for collecting internal data once established within a system or network. |
|
Command and Control |
T1090 - Proxy |
Use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for command-and-control communications. |
|
Command and Control |
T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer |
Transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. |
|
Command and Control |
T1132.001 - Data Encoding: Standard Encoding |
Encode data with a standard data encoding system to make command-and-control traffic harder to detect. |
|
Command and Control |
T1219 - Remote Access Software |
Use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. |
|
Command and Control |
T1572 - Protocol Tunnelling |
Tunnel network communications within a separate protocol to avoid detection or filtering, or to enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. |
|
Exfiltration |
T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. |
|
Exfiltration |
T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
Steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. |
|
Exfiltration |
T1048.003 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Steal data by exfiltrating it over an unencrypted network protocol other than the existing command and control channel. |
|
Impact |
T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact |
Encrypt data on target systems to interrupt availability to system and network resources. |
|
Impact |
T1490 - Inhibit System Recovery |
Delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid recovery of a corrupted system. |
| TOOL | PURPOSE |
|---|---|
|
Cobalt Strike |
Post-exploitation toolkit used for command and control, often abused to deploy beacons and maintain access. |
|
Mimikatz |
Credential dumping tool used to extract passwords, hashes and Kerberos tickets from Windows memory. |
|
Pulseway |
Legitimate RMM tool, often exploited by attackers for persistent remote access. |
|
DWAgent |
Free remote desktop software, sometimes misused for stealthy access. |
|
RemCom RAT |
Lightweight remote access tool that allows execution of commands on remote Windows systems, often used for lateral movement. |
|
FortiGate |
Next-generation firewall developed by Fortinet, providing advanced threat protection, VPN and network security features. |
|
Proton VPN |
Privacy-focused VPN service that encrypts internet traffic and hides user IP addresses. |
|
Mullvad VPN |
No-logs VPN service designed for anonymity, often used to obfuscate threat actor traffic. |
|
MeshCentral |
Open-source remote management tool that allows control of systems over the internet. |
|
DWService |
Cloud-based remote access platform enabling remote control and file transfer through a web interface. |
|
RemCom |
Lightweight remote command-line execution utility, like PsExec, used for lateral movement. |
|
WinSCP |
File transfer client for SFTP, SCP and FTP, often used for moving files between systems securely. |
|
MEGAsync |
Desktop sync client for the MEGA cloud storage service, used to upload and download large datasets. |
|
CyberDuck |
File transfer application supporting cloud and FTP protocols, often abused for exfiltrating data to cloud storage. |
|
Rclone |
Command-line tool for managing and syncing files across cloud storage providers, widely used for data exfiltration. |
https://www.stateofcyber.com.au/report/dfir#threat-actors-are-getting-smarter
Contextualises LockBit within the broader Australian ransomware landscape